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Kuhlmeier v. Hazelwood School District:
Application of the Prior Restraint and
Public Forum Doctrines to the Free
Expression Rights of High School
Students
Introduction
Public school students do not forfeit the right to free expression
under the First Amendment merely by being in school.1 The extent of a
student's free expression rights, however, is unclear. In Kuhlmeier v. Ha-
zelwood School District,2 the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals considered
a difficult and unsettled issue: whether a school administration may cen-
sor articles on sensitive subjects in a student-produced, school-sponsored
newspaper.
Since the Supreme Court's landmark decision in Tinker v. Des
Moines Independent Community School District,3 the federal courts have
heard a stream of cases concerning high school students' free expression
rights under the First Amendment.' The cases have arisen primarily as
the result of school board censorship of student newspapers5 and punish-
ment of student speech.6 However, high school first amendment issues
also arise in such school supported activities as theatrical productions,7
1. See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Comm. School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969) ("It
can hardly be argued that ... students... shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech
or expression at the schoolhouse gate."). The First Amendment provides: "Congress shall
make no law... abridging the freedom of speech .... " U.S. CONST. amend. I.
2. 795 F.2d 1368 (8th Cir. 1986), reh'g denied, 795 F.2d 1368, cert. granted, 107 S. Ct.
926 (1987).
3. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
4. See, eg., Bethel School Dist. v. Fraser, 106 S. Ct. 3159 (1986); Board of Educ. v. Pico,
457 U.S. 853 (1982); Nicholson v. Board of Educ., 682 F.2d 858 (9th Cir. 1982); Seyfried v.
Walton, 668 F.2d 214 (3d Cir. 1981); Gambino v. Fairfax County School Bd., 564 F.2d 157
(4th Cir. 1977); Trachtman v. Anker, 563 F.2d 512 (2d Cir. 1977); Nitzberg v. Parks, 525 F.2d
378 (4th Cir. 1975); Stanton v. Brunswick School Dept., 577 F. Supp. 1560 (D. Mass. 1984);
Reineke v. Cobb County School Dist., 484 F. Supp. 1252 (N.D. Ga. 1980); Frasca v. Andrews,
463 F. Supp. 1043 (E.D.N.Y. 1979); Bayer v. Kinzler, 383 F. Supp. 1164 (E.D.N.Y. 1974),
aff'd, 515 F.2d 504 (2d Cir. 1975).
5. See, eg., Gambino v. Fairfax County School Bd., 564 F.2d 157 (4th Cir. 1977).
6. See, e.g., Bethel School Dist. v. Fraser, 106 S. Ct. 3159 (1986).
7. See, eg., Seyfried v. Walton, 668 F.2d 214 (3d Cir. 1981).
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and extend into the school library and the classroom.' These cases have
in common a struggle between two potent interests: the student's interest
in free expression, squarely recognized in Tinker,9 and the school's state-
mandated interest in educating students, maintaining order, protecting
students from personal harm, and inculcating fundamental community
values.10
in Kuhimeier, the Court of Appeals came to grips with three unset-
tled issues involving student speech: (1) the application of the Tinker
test, (2) the constitutionality of prior restraint of school newspapers, and
(3) the dividing line between the school's power over curriculum and the
student's free expression right. This Comment examines the Kuhlmeier
decision and its implications. Part I presents the facts, holdings and rea-
soning of Kuhimeier, as well as the dissent by Judge Wollman.11 Part II
reviews the first amendment principles underlying the court's decision.12
Part III then examines the Kuhlmeier court's analysis, focusing on the
court's prior restraint position, its interpretation of Tinker, and its
designation of the school-supported newspaper as a public forum.13 This
Comment concludes that the Kuhlmeier court ultimately reached the
correct result, but erred in applying the public forum doctrine to achieve
that end.
I. Kuhlmeier v. Hazelwood School District
A. The Facts
Spectrum was the student-produced, school-sponsored newspaper of
Hazelwood East High School in St. Louis County, Missouri. 14 Its opera-
tion was governed by school board regulations, a board-approved text-
book, and its own policy statement.15  Members of the school's
Journalism II class staffed the newspaper. Under the direction of a
faculty advisor, the staff selected topics and wrote articles of general in-
terest to the student body and the community. The faculty advisor exer-
cised minimal control,16 but did submit each edition to Hazelwood's
8. See, e.g., Board of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853 (1982) (school libraries); Meyer v.
Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (classrooms).
9. See supra note 1.
10. See Bethel School Dist. v. Fraser, 106 S.Ct. 3159, 3165 (1986); Board of Educ. v. Pico,
457 U.S. 853, 869 (1982); Ambach v. Norwich, 441 U.S. 68, 76-77 (1979); Bender v. Williams-
port Area School Dist., 741 F.2d 538, 548 (3d Cir. 1984).
11. See infra notes 14-51 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 52-148 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 149-182 and accompanying text.
14. Kuhlmeier v. Hazelwood School Dist., 795 F.2d 1368, 1370 (8th Cir. 1986), reh'g
denied, 795 F.2d 1368, cert. granted, 107 S.Ct. 926 (1987).
15. Id. at 1372-73.
16. Id. at 1370.
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principal for prepublication review.17
The final stages of the May 13, 1983, edition of Spectrum included
articles on teen pregnancy, juvenile delinquency, runaways, abortion and
divorce." The pregnancy article featured personal accounts of three Ha-
zelwood East students who had become pregnant: it discussed each stu-
dent's reaction to the pregnancy, her relationship to the fetus' father, her
parents' reactions, and details about her sex life and birth control prac-
tices. 19 Fictitious names were used. The divorce article included quota-
tions from students, three of whom were named. The students described
their parents' behavior and its effect on the marital relationship and on
the students themselves.20 The authors obtained consent from the stu-
dents who were quoted, but not from the parents of the named students
in the divorce article.21
After reviewing the final proofs, the principal ordered the deletion of
two full pages, including the pregnancy and divorce articles as well as
three non-offending articles.22 The Spectrum staff learned of the dele-
tions when the printed newspapers were delivered for distribution. They
met with the principal, who told them the articles were "inappropriate,
personal, sensitive, and unsuitable."23 The students then reproduced the
removed articles and circulated them on school grounds, acts for which
they received no discipline.24
On August 19, 1983, three Spectrum staff members brought an ac-
tion in federal court against Hazelwood School District, the principal,
the school superintendent and his assistant. Plaintiffs sought injunctive
relief, damages, and a declaration that their first amendment rights had
been violated.25 The district court tried the case without a jury because
"the factual disputes in [the] case [were] inextricably intertwined with
the central legal [first amendment] issue."26 In two separate opinions,
Chief Judge Nangle denied injunctive relief27 and held that the deletion
of the articles did not violate the plaintiffs' first amendment rights.2"
17. Id.
18. Kuhlmeier v. Hazelwood School Dist., 607 F. Supp. 1450, 1457-58 (E.D. Mo. 1985).
19. Id. at 1457.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 1458.
22. Id. at 1459.
23. Kuhlmeier, 795 F.2d at 1371.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. 607 F. Supp. at 1450.
27. 596 F. Supp. 1422 (E.D. Mo. 1984).
28. 607 F. Supp. 1450, 1467 (E.D. Mo. 1985).
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B. The Eighth Circuit Decision
The students then appealed to the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals,
arguing the district court erred in determining that Spectrum was not a
public forum,2 9 and that the school district had not violated their first
amendment rights.30 The Court of Appeals found for the students on
both claims, and reversed the trial court's decision.
The court noted that any analysis of the first amendment rights of
students in the high school setting must begin with Tinker v. Des Moines
Independent Community School District:31 unless student expression
"materially disrupts classwork or involves substantial disorder or inva-
sion of the rights of others," school officials must afford student speech
the same first amendment protection afforded adult speech.32 The
Kuhlmeier court, however, accepted the lower court's conclusion that
the Tinker test was not sufficient to evaluate the constitutionality of a
school administration's regulation of student speech.33 The Tinker test
would apply, said the court, only if Spectrum were a public forum.34 If
Spectrum were found to be an integral part of the school curriculum, a
test more accommodating to the school officials would apply.35 The
court found Spectrum to be a public forum protected by the Tinker
standard.36
The court then applied the Tinker test to determine the constitution-
ality of the principal's censorship.37 Finding no material disruption of
classwork nor any substantial disorder as the reasonably foreseeable re-
sult of distribution of the articles, 38 the court next considered whether
29. Kuhlmeier, 795 F.2d at 1371.
30. Id.




34. Id. For a discussion of the public forum doctrine, see infra notes S6-96 and accompa-
nying text.
35. The District Court stated:
Where the particular program or activity is an integral part of the school's edu-
cational function, something less than substantial disruption may justify prior re-
straints on students' speech and press activities. The following is an acceptable
articulation of the applicable standard: "[Tihe rule has been wisely established that
decisions of school officials will be sustained, even in a First Amendment context,
when, on the facts before them at the time of the conduct which is challenged, there
was a substantial and reasonable basis for the action taken."
607 F. Supp. at 1463 (citing Frasca v. Andrews, 463 F. Supp. 1043, 1052 (E.D.N.Y. 1979)).
36. The court's finding that Spectrum was a public forum was based on evidence that the
school board intended Spectrum to operate as a conduit for expressing student viewpoints, and
on evidence that Spectrum did so operate. 795 F.2d at 1372-73.
37. Id. at 1374-76.
38. Id. at 1375.
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the rights of others had been invaded.39 Citing a law review Note," the
court decided that a school official may regulate student speech under the
"rights of others" segment of the Tinker test only if the unregulated ex-
pression would bring tort liability on the school.41 The court found that
in each article, permission had been given by the subjects, pseudonyms
had been used, or the material simply did not invade the privacy of the
person referred to in the text.42 Thus, the principal's actions could not be
justified under the "rights of others" test.43 The court concluded that the
first amendment rights of the students had therefore been violated.
The court remanded the case to the district court to determine the
amount of damages.' The court did not declare unconstitutional either
the principal's rule of prepublication review or selected Hazelwood
School Board policies, trusting that the school administration would in
the future apply these rules to comport with the court's opinion.45
Judge Wollman's dissent stressed that Spectrum was indeed an inte-
gral part of Hazelwood High School's curriculum,46 and that only activ-
ity "totally removed from the aegis of the school" could receive the first
amendment protection provided by Tinker.47 Thus, Hazelwood's princi-
pal, though possibly overly cautious, deserved deference in this curricu-
lum-related decision.48 Judge Wollman concluded that deleting the
articles did not violate the students' first amendment rights.4 9
The school district appealed to the Supreme Court. The Court
granted certiorari, 0 and will hear arguments in the case of Hazelwood
School District v. Kuhlmeier in the fall of 1987.1
II. First Amendment Free Speech Protection
The First Amendment provides: "Congress shall make no law...
abridging the freedom of speech .... .",2 Although this language is sus-
39. Id. For discussion of the Tinker "rights of others" test, see infra notes 118-132 and
accompanying text.
40. Note, Administrative Regulation of the High School Press, 83 MICH. L. R~v. 625, 640
(1984).
41. Kuhlmeier, 795 F.2d at 1375-76.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. 795 F.2d at 1377 (the court was convinced that the facts would only give rise to
nominal damages).
45. Id. The plaintiffs' demand for a jury trial was not considered in view of the court's
favorable holdings for the plaintiffs on the first amendment issues. Id. at 1377-78.
46. Id. at 1378 (Wollman, J., dissenting).
47. Id. (emphasis added).
48. Id. at 1379.
49. Id.
50. Hazelwood School Dist. v. Kuhhmeier, 107 S. Ct. 926 (1987).
51. San Francisco Chronicle, Jan. 21, 1987, at 8, col. 4.
52. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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ceptible to an "absolutist", literal interpretation,13 the Supreme Court
has indicated that speech may be restricted by the government. 4 There
is no simple test, however, for determining what speech is protected by
the First Amendment.5 The cases represent struggles between myriad
competing values, struggles whose resolution must depend on the facts of
each situation: the who,5 6 what, 57 when, where, how, 58 and why 9 of the
expression itself, and of the challenged restriction.6 In attempting to
resolve these struggles the Court has developed various analyses for
resolving the free speech issues which faced the Kuhlmeier court.
A. Speech Outside the High School Setting
A speaker's identity, or that of her audience, may determine the ex-
tent of the protection her expressive act will receive. For example, the
Court has defined particular levels of first amendment protection for chil-
dren61 and prisoners. Most cases, however, concern the constitutional-ity of restricting speech aimed at, or delivered by, the average adult.
1. Content Based Regulation
The degree to which speech is subject to content-based regulation
depends on whether the speech falls within certain limited categories of
unprotected speech. In Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire,63 the Supreme
Court recognized "well defined and narrowly limited" types of expres-
sion whose content is of "such slight social value" as to merit no first
53. Justice Black stated: "[I] believe that the First Amendment's unequivocal command
that there shall be no abridgement of the rights of free speech ... shows that the men who
drafted our Bill of Rights did all the balancing that was to be done in this field .... [Tihe
Court's absolute statement that there are no "absolutes" under the First Amendment must be
an exaggeration of its own views." Konigsberg v. State Bar of Cal., 366 U.S. 36, 60-61 (1961)
(Black, J., dissenting).
54. See Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
55. For example, the "clear and present danger" test of the Schenck line of cases proved
inappropriate for application in many first amendment disputes, giving rise to other methods
of analysis, like categorical proscription analysis (discussed infra at notes 63-73 and accompa-
nying text) and time, place, and manner analysis (discussed infra at notes 80-85 and accompa-
nying text).
56. See infra text accompanying notes 61-62.
57. See infra notes 63-79 and accompanying text.
58. See infra notes 80-96 and accompanying text for discussion of "when, where and
how" (time, place and manner) speech restraints.
59. See Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211, 215 (1919) (intent of speaker relevant to issue
of whether speech would be protected).
60. See infra notes 97-111 and accompanying text.
61. See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982); FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726
(1978).
62. See Pelt v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822 (1974).
63. 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
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amendment protection."4 The Chaplinsky Court's division of speech into
protected and non-protected classes survives today.65 The government
may engage in absolute censorship, or "categorical proscription,
66 of
certain precise categories of speech, including: (1) speech that creates a
clear and present danger of illegal behavior;67 (2) obscenity; 68 (3) defama-
tion;69 (4) false or misleading commercial speech;70 and (5) child pornog-
raphy.71  Categorical proscription analysis, however, is not always
exclusively content based. For example, determination of whether
speech creates a clear and present danger of illegal behavior requires con-
sideration of the physical context of the delivery72 and the nature of the
audience.73
Even when the content of speech places it outside the proscribed
categories, that content may still affect the degree of first amendment
protection. Political speech,7' for example, lies "within the core protec-
tion of the First Amendment."75 Governmental restrictions on political
64. Id. at 571-72.
65. See, eg., Central Hudson Gas and Electric Corp. v. Public Service Comm'n, 447 U.S.
557, 563 (1980) (misleading commercial speech is unprotected by the First Amendment);
Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 23 (1973) (obscene material is unprotected by the First
Amendment).
66. Farber & Nowak, The Misleading Nature of Public Forum Analysis: Content and Con-
text in First Amendment Adjudication, 70 VA. L. REv. 1219, 1226-30 (1984).
67. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969).
68. See Paris Adult Theatre v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 54 (1973); Miller v. California, 413
U.S. 15, 23 (1973).
69. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974); New York Times Co. v. Sulli-
van, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
70. See Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 563-66
(1980).
71. See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982).
72. See Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
73. See Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229, 236 (1963).
74. "Political speech" has no set definition. Professor Meiklejohn defines political speech
broadly to encompass education, philosophy, science, literature and the arts. Meiklejohn, The
First Amendment is an Absolute, 1961 Sup. CT. REv. 245, 256-57. Professor Bork (currently
Circuit Judge for the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals and a recent nominee to the Supreme
Court) offers a more focused definition: "The category of protected [political] speech should
consist of speech concerned with governmental behavior, policy or personnel... not...
scientific, educational ... or literary expressions . .. " Bork, Neutral Principles and Some
First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 27-28 (1971).
75. Capital Broadcasting Co. v. Mitchell, 333 F. Supp. 582, 587 (D.D.C. 1971) (Wright,
J., dissenting), aff'd sub nom. Capital Broadcasting Co. v. Acting Attorney General, 405 U.S.
1000 (1972). See also Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 369 (1931) ("The maintenance of
the opportunity for free political discussion to the end that government may be responsive to
the will of the people and that changes may be obtained by lawful means, an opportunity
essential to the security of the Republic, is a fundamental principle of our constitutional
system.").
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speech must therefore demonstrate the highest justification.76 Commer-
cial speech is also protected,77 though to a lesser degree than political
speech.7" Governmental regulation of commercial speech triggers an in-
termediate level of judicial scrutiny."
2. Non-Content Based Regulation
There are essentially two methods of regulating free expression
without looking to the content of the speech. First, there are time, place
and manner restrictions which regulate the means of expression. Second,
there is the public forum doctrine which is used to determine how much
regulation speech can be subjected to, based on the nature of the forum
used.
a. Time, Place and Manner Analysis
Time, place and manner restrictions focus on the time,8 0 location,8'
or physical manner 2 of the expressive activity, rather than on the con-
tent of the speech. Such restrictions are constitutional if they "are con-
tent neutral, are narrowly tailored to serve a significant government
interest, and leave open ample alternative channels of communication."8 3
Time, place and manner restrictions must not be overbroad or vague.8 4
76. Restraints on political speech are constitutional only if they serve a compelling gov-
ernmental interest, and use the least drastic means to achieve that interest. See Consolidated
Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 540 (1980); First Nat'l Bank of Boston v.
Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 786 (1978); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 25 (1976).
77. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S.
748, 773 (1976). "Commercial speech... may be understood as speech of any form that
advertises a product or service for profit or for a business purpose." J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA
& J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 904 (3d ed. 1986). See generally Comment, In re R. J.
Reynolds Tobacco Co., Inc.: The "Common Sense" Distinction Between Commercial and
Noncommercial Speech, 14 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 869 (1987).
78. See Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622, 642 (1951); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319
U.S. 105, 110-11 (1943).
79. A restriction on commercial speech must directly advance a substantial governmental
interest, and must not be more extensive than is neccessary to serve that interest. The First
Amendment does not protect commercial speech that is misleading or concerns unlawful activ-
ity. Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Service Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980).
80. See, e.g., Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972) (upholding an ordinance
restricting expressive activity on property adjacent to a school during school hours).
81. See, e.g., Heffron v. International Society for Krishna Consciousness, 452 U.S. 640
(1981) (state law requiring that solicitation of funds by religious groups be conducted from
booths found to be a reasonable time, place and manner regulation).
82. See, e.g., Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288 (1984) (Na-
tional Park Service regulation prohibiting sleeping in park in connection with a demonstration
upheld as a reasonable restriction on the manner in which a demonstration could be carried
out).
83. United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 177 (1983).
84. See, e.g., Grayned, 408 U.S. at 108-21.
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In assessing the constitutional validity of these regulations, the Court
balances the governmental interests served by the regulation against any
incidental restriction of free expression. This balancing ensures that the
regulation is not an "unnecessary or gratuitous suppression of
communication."8 5
b. Public Forum Analysis
The public forum doctrine 6 relates to time, place, and manner re-
strictions at particular public places 7 or from governmentally controlled
channels of communication." Under this doctrine, courts initially classi-
fied types of property and communications media as open to the public,
and protected only speech that occurred on "public forums."8 9 The
Supreme Court has refined this rigid approach by suggesting three types
of public property, in descending order of protectiveness: the "tradi-
tional public forum," the "designated public forum," and the "nonpublic
forum."9 0 When categorizing a site or speech medium as one of the three
public forum types, the Court looks to the government's intent in creat-
85. J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTrrUTIONAL LAW 970-71 (3d ed. 1986).
86. The term "public forum" was first employed in International Ass'n of Machinists v.
Street, 367 U.S. 740 (1961). The public forum concept, however, dates back to the famous
dictum of Justice Roberts in Hague v. C.LO.: "Wherever the title of streets and parks may
rest, they have immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public and, time out of mind,
have been used for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, and dis-
cussing public questions." 307 U.S. 496, 515-16 (1939).
87. See, eg., City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789 (1984)
(ordinance prohibiting posting of signs on public property upheld as applied to lightposts,
which did not constitute a public forum).
88. See, e.g., Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense and Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788 (1985)
(executive order upheld which limited access of nonprofit organizations to federally controlled
charitable contribution program).
89. See, e.g., Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S 298, 301-04 (1974) (no constitu-
tional right to advertise political candidacy in city-owned transit vehicles which were not pub-
lic forums); Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 836 (1976) (public area of Army base not a public
forum, therefore base commander's refusal to allow plaintiff to make a political speech on the
base did not violate the First Amendment).
90. These three public forum categories were created in Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local
Educator's Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37,45-46 (1983), and were further defined in Cornelius v. NAACP
Legal Defense and Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 799-811 (1985). "Traditional public fora are
those places which 'by long tradition or by government fiat have been devoted to assembly and
debate.'... Public streets and parks fall into this category." Id. at 802 (citing Perry, 460 U.S.
at 45). "[S]peakers can be excluded from a [traditional] public forum only when the exclusion
is necessary to serve a compelling state interest and the exclusion is narrowly drawn to achieve
that interest." Id. at 800. "[A designated public forum] may be created by government
designation of a place or channel of communication for use by the public at large for assembly
and speech, for use by certain speakers, or for the discussion of certain subjects." Id. at 802
(citing Perry, 460 U.S. at 45, 46 n.7). "[W]hen the Government has intentionally designated a
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ing the forum.91 The Court may examine the nature of the property or
medium and its compatibility with expressive activity to discern the gov-
ernment's intent.92
Public forum analysis has drawn sharp dissent,93 as well as criticism
from academic commentators, for stressing the features of a site or com-
munication channel instead of the speaker's and the government's con-
flicting interests.94 Two professors advocate replacement of public forum
analysis with a "focused balancing" approach 95 in decisions involving
place or means of communication as a public forum speakers cannot be excluded without a
compelling governmental interest." .d. at 800.
"[P]roperty which is not by tradition or designation a forum for public communication
[i.e., a nonpublic forum] is governed by different standards .... In addition to time, place, and
manner regulations, the State may reserve the forum for its intended purposes, communicative
or otherwise, as long as the regulation on speech is reasonable and [viewpoint neutral]." Perry,
460 U.S. at 46.
91. Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 802.
92. Id. See, e.g., Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 267 n.5 (1981) (In finding that a
university had a policy of making meeting facilities open to student groups, the Court consid-
ered relevant the fact that a university campus possessed many characteristics of a traditional
public forum. The policy evidenced an intent to create a public forum.).
93. See, eg., Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 820 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (the examination of
relevant interests is more important than public forum analysis, which is but analytical short-
hand for underlying principles); id. at 833 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (public forum analysis is of
questionable value in the actual decisional process); Perry, 460 U.S. at 65 (Brennan, 3., dissent-
ing) (public forum analysis "irrelevant"); Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 860 (1976) (Brennan,
J., dissenting) ("[T]he Court's forum approach to public speech blind[s] it to proper regard for
First Amendment interests").
94. See, eg., Farber & Nowak, supra note 66, at 1224:
Our objection to public forum analysis is not that it invariably yields wrong
results (although it sometimes does), but that it distracts attention from the first
amendment values at stake in a given case. It almost certainly will hinder lower
court judges from focusing on those values or from making sense of Supreme Court
precedent.
Id. See also M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEEcH 4-74, 4-76 (1984):
It may be argued that whether or not given premises are labeled "public forum"
is irrelevant since the First Amendment standards applied by the Court do not mean-
ingfully turn on this label.... [T]he three elements--content neutrality, significant
governmental interest and alternative means of communication-are necessary in or-
der to validate a speech restriction regardless of whether or not the premises thus
restricted are regarded as a public forum.
Id.
95. Professors Farber and Nowak write:
Classification of public places as various types of forums has only confused judi-
cial opinions by diverting attention from the real first amendment issues involved in
the cases. Like the fourth amendment, the first amendment "protects people, not
places." Constitutional protection should depend not on labeling the speaker's physi-
cal location but on the first amendment values and governmental interests involved
in the case. Of course, governmental interests are often tied to the nature of the
place. Public sidewalks, for example, are generally places where the goverrnment's
interests are rather weak, given the diverse uses of sidewalks. At the same time,
because sidewalks and streets have often served as forums of last resort for those who
cannot afford other media of expression, the first amendment interests at stake may
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"situational restraints"-speech restraints which mix content and loca-
tional concerns.96 The public forum doctrine nonetheless remains a cen-
tral, if confusing, analytical tool for the lower courts in some first
amendment cases.
3. Prior Restraint
"Prior restraint" is a first amendment term of art referring to a par-
ticular means of preventing speech. Prior restraints are distinguished
from legal measures which inhibit speech through a threat of subsequent
punishment.9 7 Prior restraint refers instead to a category of methods of
restricting speech which are commonly held to be, by their nature, more
inimical to first amendment values than subsequent punishment.9" The
Supreme Court has consistently disfavored prior restraint devices.9 9
Historically, prior restraint meant censorship laws which required
that the speaker obtain a license from the government in order to pub-
llsh.' ° Today, the term encompasses more than governmental licensing
requirements. In Near v. Minnesota, 10 the Court struck down as an im-
proper restraint a statute authorizing judicial abatement of "malicious,
scandalous, and defamatory" newspaper publications.10 2 Forty years
later, in New York Times Co. v. United States ("The Pentagon Papers
Case"), 103 the Court announced two basic rules concerning prior re-
straints: (1) any system of prior restraint bears a heavy presumption of
be especially high. Consequently, the balance may well tilt in favor of free speech
more often when a sidewalk is involved than when some other place is involved. To
this extent, the public forum doctrine is a useful heuristic device-a shorthand
method of invoking this balance of interest. But when the heuristic device becomes
the exclusive method of analysis, only confusion and mistakes can result.
Farber & Nowak, supra note 66, at 1234-35.
96. Professors Farber and Nowak's focused balancing test requires as a threshold that a
situational restraint have clearly articulated goals which are themselves consistent with first
amendment values (i.e. content neutrality). A balancing test follows the threshold require-
ments: the regulation must "be shown to serve a governmental interest that outweighs [the
regulation's] impact on speech." Id. at 1243.
97. For example, though a statute forbidding theater owners from showing obscene films
might "restrain" speech which comes after the statute is passed, it would not constitute a prior
restraint in the technical sense. Such a statute would fall under the heading of "subsequent
punishment."
98. For a discussion of the dangers of prior restraint, see infra notes 106-111 and accom-
panying text.
99. See Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415, 418-19 (1971); New York
Times Co. v. United States (The Pentagon Papers Case), 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971) (per
curiam); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 713-14 (1931).
100. See Near, 283 U.S. at 713; Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 451-52 (1938); see also L.
LEVY, LEGACY OF SUPPRESSION: FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND PRESS IN EARLY AMERICAN
HISTORY 216-17 (1960).
101. 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
102. Id. at 701-03.
103. 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (per curiam).
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unconstitutionality, and (2) the government carries a heavy burden to
justify any system of prior restraint."° Again, the method of regulation
in question was a court injunction.10 5
The Court is concerned primarily with the potential for abuse asso-
ciated with prior restraints as opposed to subsequent punishment.10 6 For
example, administrative restraint of speech, as exemplified by the func-
tioning of licensing boards, is prone to abuse due to the administrator's
loyalty to the specific governmental program she serves.107 This loyalty
tends to override broader concerns, such as a speaker's constitutional
rights.'08 Court ordered injunctions also offer opportunities for abuse.
Potentially easier to obtain and procedurally swifter than criminal prose-
cutions, 09 civil injunctions invite indiscriminate application. Even if a
temporary restraining order is eventually overturned, the government
may already have achieved its illicit goal by halting expression at a cru-
cial time."10 "If subsequent punishment chills, prior restraint freezes.""'
B. Student Speech
The justifications for restricting adult speech also may limit the free
expression rights of high school students. In addition, special character-
istics of the high school setting justify additional control over speech.
The Supreme Court first attempted to delimit the extent of students' free
expression rights in Tinker v. Des Moines Independent School District."2
L Tinker: Free Expression in the High School Setting
In Tinker, the Supreme Court recognized that first amendment pro-
tections extend to students in public schools." 3 Holding that a school
ban against wearing black armbands in protest of the Viet Nam War
104. Id. at 714.
105. Id.
106. See, e.g., Southeastern Productions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 553, 559 (1975).
107. As Chief Justice Warren observed in his dissent, Times Film Corp. v. City of Chicago,
365 U.S. 43, 67 (1961): "The censor is beholden to those who sponsored the creation of his
offic.... "
108. See Mayton, Toward a theory of First Amendment Process: Injunctions of Speech, Sub-
sequent Punishment, and the Costs of the Prior Restraint Doctrine, 67 CORNELL L. R v 245,
250 (1982).
109. See J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 867 (3d ed.
1986).
110. As Justice Douglas observed in his dissent in Walker v. City of Birmingham, 388 U.S.
307, 336 (1967): "[I]f a person must pursue his judicial remedy [of appealing on injunction]
before he may speak .... the occasion when protest is desired or needed will have become
history and any later speech... will be futile or pointless."
111. See J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 867 (3d ed.
1986).
112. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
113. See supra note 1.
[Vol. 14:889
violated students' right to free expression, the Court created a now famil-
iar standard for reviewing the constitutionality of high school regulations
affecting speech: student expression may be curtailed only when it "ma-
terially disrupts classwork or involves substantial disorder or invasion of
the rights of others . ... ,14
Tinker involved regulation of speech on public property, and thus
presented a public forum issue." 5 However, the Tinker court declined to
employ the nascent public forum doctrine. "16 Instead, the Court struck a
balance between competing interests in the high school environment: the
students' free expression interest and the state's interest in fulfilling its
educational mission and in protecting the personal rights of its students.
The Tinker test embodies this balance by preventing school officials from
restricting student speech which neither disrupts education nor invades
the rights of others. Thus the Tinker decision, because it avoided the
misdirected emphasis used in public forum analysis,' 17 provides a useful
starting point for lower courts in deciding high school first amendment
disputes.
2. Beyond Tinker: Unsolved Questions
a. Applying the "Rights of Others" Justification
While courts have found the "material disruption" and "substantial
disorder" segments of the Tinker standard relatively noncontroversial, 18
the "rights of others" test has proven less handy.119 This test allows
school officials to forbid student expression which invades others'
rights. 120 The two cases decided before Kuhlmeier interpreted the test in
markedly different ways.
114. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 513.
115. See infra notes 86-92 and accompanying text.
116. Justice Brennan made this observation in Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 858 (1976)
(Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan sought to demonstrate that the notion of a "public
forum" was not the "touchstone of public expression." Id. at 859.
117. Public forum analysis encourages scrutiny of the nature of the location to the exclu-
sion of the parties' interests. See infra notes 93-96 and accompanying text.
118. See, eg., Trachtman v. Anker, 563 F.2d 512, 521 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S.
925 (1978) (Mansfield, J., dissenting):
The Tinker test makes sense as a standard designed to insure that school officials
will be permitted, even at the expense of some freedom of expression, to maintain
order on the school premises, particularly in the classroom, and it has been construed
by ourselves and other circuits as permitting an abridgement of free speech toward
that end.
Id.
119. "The phrase 'invasion of the rights of others' is not a model of clarity or preciseness."
Eisner v. Stamford Bd. of Educ., 440 F.2d 803, 808 (2d Cir. 1971).
120. "[I]nvasion of the rights of others is, of course, not immunized by the constitutional
guarantee of freedom of speech." Tinker, 393 U.S. at 513. The Court in Tinker recognized in
particular "the rights of... students to be secure and to be let alone." Id. at 508.
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In Trachtman v. Anker,"2' the Second Circuit held that distribution
of a student questionnaire on sexual attitudes and experiences, and publi-
cation of the results, would invade the rights of students by "subjecting
them to psychological pressures."' 122 The court permitted censorship by
school officials even though the questionnaires were completed anony-
mously and voluntarily.123 This broad interpretation of the "rights of
others" invaded by student speech clearly allowed the school officials
great latitude in censoring student speech.1 24
In Frasca v. Andrews, 2 a district court interpreted the "rights of
others" test more narrowly. In Frasca, a school administrator seized all
copies of a newspaper containing a substantially untrue and potentially
libelous letter to the editor criticising a student government officer.1 26
The court asserted that the principal was justified in believing, based on
facts known at the time of the seizure, that the article was libelous, and
would have a devastating impact on the libelled student.127 The court
held, therefore, that the pricipal's seizure was not in violation of the First
Amendment. 12
8
In a law review Note129 analyzing the "rights of others" test, the
student author praised the Frasca approach and went further. The only
circumstance properly triggering prior restraint under the "rights of
others" test, the Note argued, is potential tort liability for the school as a
result of the student expression.' 30 The Note maintained that a less ex-
acting standard would allow school officials to abuse the test.' 3' The
Court of Appeals in Kuhlmeier cited the Note's approach with
approval.'3 2
b. Prior Restraint in the High School Setting
Tinker held unconstitutional the punishment of students who had
121. 563 F.2d 512 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 453 U.S. 925 (1978).
122. Id. at 516, 519-20.
123. Id. at 515.
124. "We believe that the school authorities are sufficiently experienced and knowledgeable
in these matters, which have been entrusted to them by the community. .. ." Id. at 519.
125. 463 F. Supp. 1043 (E.D.N.Y. 1979).
126. Id. at 1046. The newspaper also contained a letter to the editor and its response,
which provided additional justification for the seizure. Id. The letter's inflammatory content
presaged a "substantial risk of disruption of school activities." Id. at 1051.
127. Id. at 1052.
128. Id.
129. See Note, supra note 40, at 641.
130. Id. at 640-44.
131. Id.
132. See supra text accompanying notes 40-43.
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worn protest armbands.1 33 It was not, therefore, a prior restraint case,
but concerned subsequent punishment. 134 However, many lower courts
have used the Tinker standard to test prior restraint of student speech. 135
Lower court decisions vary widely in deciding the types of student speech
which may be restricted, and in determining the criteria for testing the
constitutionality of such prior restraint regulations.
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals has developed an approach
paralleled by most courts of appeals. 136  The Second Circuit permits
prior restraints by school officials when the regulatory standards and
clearance procedures are defined in advance, and review of submitted
student publications is expeditious.137 The Second Circuit is the most
permissive toward school officials, allowing them wide power and discre-
tion to determine what student speech may be suppressed, and what con-
stitutes a disruption. 131
The Seventh Circuit provides greater protection of student speech,
applying the Tinker formula only to punishment of students, not to prior
restraint. 139 Schools may restrict the distribution of printed materials by
means of time, place, and manner rules, however, and may punish stu-
dents whose speech falls into proscribable categories, such as obscene or
libelous literature.1" In sum, the circuits are split on the permissibility of
prior restraint of student speech, and on the level of discretion to be al-
lowed school officials in regulating student speech.
133. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 504.
134. Id. Tinker, it has been argued, approves censorship of student expression by school
authorities before the disruption or invasion of others' rights occurs. The relevant language in
the Tinker decision refers to "any facts which might reasonably have led school authorities to
forecast substantial disruption of or material interference with school activities." Id. at 514
(emphasis added). See Note, supra note 40, at 635. It is just as likely, however, that the Court
in Tinker was referring to facts appearing after commencement of an expressive act which
presaged substantial disruption. The facts of Tinker presented such a scenario. Tinker, 393
U.S. at 509 (halting of protest occurred only after students had worn armbands on school
grounds). Accord Fujishima v. Board of Educ., 460 F.2d 1355, 1358 (7th Cir. 1972).
135. See, ag., Karp v. Becken, 477 F.2d 171, 175 (9th Cir. 1973); Quarterman v. Byrd, 453
F.2d 54, 58 (4th Cir. 1971); Eisner v. Stamford Bd. of Educ., 440 F.2d 803, 808 (2d Cir. 1971).
Cf. Nicholson v. Board of Educ., 682 F.2d 858, 863, n.3 (9th Cir. 1982); Riseman v. School
Comm., 439 F.2d 148, 149 (Ist Cir. 1971); Burch v. Barker, 651 F. Supp. 1149, 1154 (W.D.
Wash. 1987).
136. See Eisner v. Stamford Bd. of Educ., 440 F.2d 803 (2d Cir. 1971).
137. Id. at 809-11.
138. Fujishima v. Board of Educ., 460 F.2d 1355, 1358-59 (7th Cir. 1977).
139. Id. at 1359.
140. School authorities need only demonstrate a reasonable basis for "prior restraint" of
student speech. Eisner, 440 F.2d at 810.
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c. The Relevance of the School's Control Over Curriculum
Several lower courts have attempted to avoid Tinker's protection for
student speech. These courts assert that a certain school speech medium
must be adjudged a public forum before it may come within Tinker's
reach. 141 Relying on Supreme Court decisions which would bestow near
complete discretion on school officials in matters of curriculum choice, 42
some courts have reasoned that areas of the school's operation which are
an integral part of the curriculum must not be considered public fo-
rums. 143 Since, in Tinker, the Court declined to employ the public forum
doctrine,'" and since that case concerned student expression carried on
outside the school's curriculum, 145 that decision offers no guidance to the
lower courts in school curriculum cases.
The lower courts lack Supreme Court guidance for decisions relat-
ing curriculum to free speech rights in public forums. The Court has
never employed curriculum-noncurriculum distinctions in conjunction
with the public forum doctrine.146 Thus, a court choosing to apply pub-
lic forum analysis must resort to forced analogies to the facts of other
lower court decisions decided on public forum or curriculum grounds. 4 7
The danger in this approach is that the real interests at stake-the stu-
141. See, eg., Gambino v. Fairfax County School Bd., 429 F. Supp. 731, 734, aff'd, 564
F.2d 157 (4th Cir. 1977); Zucker v. Panitz, 299 F. Supp. 102, 104-05 (S.D.N.Y. 1969). Cf. San
Diego Comm. Against Registration and the Draft (Card) v. Governing Bd. of Grossmont
Union High School Dist., 790 F.2d 1471, 1476 (9th Cir. 1986) (student newspaper was a public
forum, therefore school board's exclusion of political advertisement without a compelling gov-
ernmental interest violated the First Amendment).
142. See, e.g., Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 107 (1968) (the state has an "undoubted
right to prescribe the curriculum for its public schools," though this right may not be exercised
in derogation of the First Amendment).
143. See, e.g., Seyfried v. Walton, 668 F.2d 214, 216 (3d Cir. 1981); Kuhlmeier v. Hazel-
wood School Dist., 607 F. Supp. 1450, 1465 (E.D. Mo. 1985).
144. See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
145. The wearing of armbands in Tinker was planned and carried out by the students and
their parents, independent of any school program. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 504.
146. In Bethel School Dist. v. Fraser, 106 S. Ct. 3159 (1986), the Court implicitly recog-
nized the importance of ties between the punished speech and the school's curriculum in decid-
ing public school free speech issues. The Court held that the "determination of what manner
of speech in the classroom or in school assembly is inapproriate properly rests with the school
board." Id. at 3165. The Court also noted that "a high school assembly or classroom is no
place for a sexually explicit monologue" and that "it was perfectly appropriate for the school
to disassociate itself.. ." to avoid leaving the impression on students that lewd speech was a
part of the school's curricular mission. Id. at 3166-67. Significantly, the Fraser decision con-
tamined no public forum analysis. Accordingly, the Fraser decision represents a recent signal
from the Court that curriculum ties can be relevant to high school free speech issues without
inclusion of public forum concepts.
147. See Kuhlmeier, 607 F. Supp. at 1462-67.
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dent's free speech right and the state's interest in education 14 8-- are ne-
glected in the effort to fit the case's facts into either the curriculum or the
public forum classification.
I. Kuhlmeier Reconsidered
A. The "Rights of Others" Justification Defined
The Kuhlmeier court, in interpreting the Tinker "rights of others"
test, required that tort liability on the part of the school be a foreseeable
result of the targeted speech.1 49 This was a novel step,150 but probably a
sound choice. The Tinker Court had taken the "rights of others" test
from Blackwell v. issaquena County Board of Education.51 In Blackwell,
school authorities had disciplined students who spread their message by
physically accosting their peers to pin protest buttons on them-conduct
tantamount to battery.152 Thus the Eighth Circuit's use of the tort liabil-
ity test in Kuhimeier was consistent with the test's tort-based origin.
Trachtman v. Anker 1 3 shows how a loose interpretation of the
rights of others test may lead to overregulation of student speech by
school officials. In Trachtman, school officials used the "rights of
others" test to justify censorship of material which invaded no one's
rights, but merely offended the sensibilities of the school administra-
tion.154 Trachtman suggests that the Kuhlmeier court's concerns about
148. See supra notes 93-111 and accompanying text.
149. Kuhlmeier, 795 F.2d at 1375-76.
150. Though the court in Frasca v. Andrews, 463 F. Supp. 1043 (E.D.N.Y. 1979), recog-
nized libelling another student as a violation of the "rights of others" test, it did not adopt a
tort based interpretation of the test as a rule.
151. 363 F.2d 749 (5th Cir. 1966).
152. W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 39
(1984) ("A harmful or offensive contact with a person, resulting from an act intended to cause
the plaintiff or a third person to suffer such a contact ... is a battery").
153. 563 F.2d 512 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 925 (1978). See supra notes 121-
124 and accompanying text.
154. The trial court in Trachtman had found that the speech at issue might conceivably
have embarrassed or even have caused anxiety and emotional difficulties in some of the more
sensitive Hazelwood High students. Trachtman, 563 F.2d at 517-19. Tinker, however, re-
quires more: "[School officials] must be able to show that [their] action was caused by some-
thing more than a mere desire to avoid the discomfort and unpleasantness that always
accompany an unpopular viewpoint." 393 U.S. at 509. See also Note, supra note 3, at 640. In
addition, the view of high school students as any more sensitive than the average adult to the
sexual content of the questionnaire in Trachtman is arguably outdated and unnecessarily pa-
ternalistic. See Note, Tinker Goes to the Theater: Student First Amendment Rights and High
School Theatrical Productions in Seyfried v. Walton, 11 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 247, 277-78
(1984). "Some courts have recognized as futile educators' attempts to limit the discussion of
certain ideas deemed inappropriate for secondary students when those same values are much
in evidence beyond the schoolhouse gate." Id. at 277 (citing Keefe v. Geanakos, 418 F.2d 359,
361-62 (lst Cir. 1969).
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overregulation by school officials were justified. 155  Furthermore,
Kuhlmeier's potential tort liability standard would not strip school offi-
cials of discretion over all student speech; the remaining segments of the
Tinker test-substantial disorder and material disruption of classwork-
permit properly limited regulation by school officials. Therefore, the
Kuhimeier court significantly advanced first amendment law in the
school setting by adopting its tort based interpretation of the Tinker
"rights of others" test.
B. Prior Restraint Approved
The Kuhlmeier court chose to reject the Seventh Circuit's reasoning
protecting student free expression rights,15 6 and adopted the Second Cir-
cuit's position that prior restraints of student expression are permissible
under certain circumstances.1 57 The test approved by the Kuhlmeier
court provides that a school official may restrain student speech only if
she reasonably believes it will violate the Tinker standards. 15  If censor-
ship prior to publication is justified, "the least restrictive means are to be
followed."15 9 Thus the principal's censorship of two full pages to elimi-
nate two offending articles,1 60 at the same time deleting three non-offend-
ing articles, would probably constitute an unlawful restraint even if the
two offensive articles were properly censored under Tinker. The court
also directed that students be given an early opportunity to alter their
articles to conform to appropriate standards.16 1 Since the court found
the student articles acceptable, as written, under the Tinker standard, the
students presumably would not have been required to make any such
alterations. Finally, once a student challenges an administrator's deci-
sion, the school carries the burden of justifying its action under the
Tinker guidelines. 162
These standards and procedures offer a balanced, middle ground so-
lution to a difficult problem. On one hand, the court avoided the Seventh
Circuit's per se proscription of content related prior restraint. The Sev-
enth Circuit approach triggers the Tinker concerns regarding potential
155. The Kuhlmeler court's tort-based interpretation, however, arguably might encourage
school officials to be overly sensitive to potential lawsuits, and might thus backfire by produc-
ing a speech restrictive side effect. To prevent this effect, school boards can issue legally so-
phisticated guidelines to enable administrators to make safe yet nonrestrictive decisions. In
addition, administrators should be encouraged to consult the school district's legal counsel in
tough cases.
156. Fujishima v. Board of Educ., 460 F.2d 1355, 1358 (7th Cir. 1972). See supra notes
138-139 and accompanying text.
157. See supra notes 136-137 and accompanying text.
158. Kuhlmeier, 795 F.2d at 1374 n.5.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 1370-71.
161. Id. at 1377.
162. Id.
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school disruption and invasion of individual rights. 1 6 3 Nor are students
necessarily protected against arbitrary restrictions when prior restraints
are forbidden, since the school administration can still impose arbitrary
post-publication punishments.' 1 The court also discouraged abuse of
prior restraint by setting forth the requirements and procedures outlined
above. While the Supreme Court clearly indulges in a presumption
against prior restraints, 165 and this presumption exists, to some extent,
with respect to children as well as adults, 6 6 it is also well established that
the constitutional rights of students are not automatically coextensive
with those of adults.' 67 Therefore, the special need in the school environ-
ment to protect against disruption and to protect the rights of students
may justify administrative review which would be impermissible in the
adult context.
C. A "Public Forum" Recognized
Though the Kuhlmeier court viewed its interpretation of the "rights
of others" test as the "heart of the case,"'6 8 perhaps a more fundamental
issue was presented by the court's problematic treatment of the public
forum question. 69 If Spectrum was found to be a public forum, said the
court, the censored articles would be entitled to the first amendment pro-
tections provided by the Tinker test.' 70 In determining that Spectrum
was such a forum, the court gave short shrift to the state's interest in
regulating the student speech,' 7 ' instead concentrating on explaining
why Spectrum qualified as a public forum. The court's search for quali-
fying factors replaced the constitutionally urgent need to identify and
balance the conflicting and legitimate interests of both parties, students
and school officials. 17 This talismanic use of the public forum category
was unnecessary, under existing authority, to reach a result respectful of
the student's first amendment rights.
There is Supreme Court authority to assist lower courts in identify-
ing the state's interest in regulating the content of a student newspaper
163. See Note, supra note 40, at 635-36.
164. Id.
165. See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
166. Burch v. Barker, 651 F.Supp. 1149, 1153 (W.D. Wash. 1987).
167. Bethel School Dist. v. Fraser, 106 S. Ct. 3159, 3164 (1986); New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469
U.S. 325, 339-343 (1985) (school officials may subject students to searches which would be
impermissible in the adult context).
168. 795 F.2d at 1375.
169. See supra notes 86-96 and accompanying text.
170. See supra text accompanying notes 112-133 (discussion of Tinker free speech protec-
tions); see also supra note 35 (lesser speech protection for non-public forums).
171. In fact consideration of state interests appears nowhere in the Court's public forum
determination. Only by applying the Tinker test later in the opinion did the court implicitly
recognize state interests. 795 F.2d at 1374-76.
172. See Farber & Nowak, supra note 66, at 1234-35.
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like Spectrum. The Supreme Court has acknowledged that public
schools are vitally important as vehicles for "inculcating fundamental
values." '17 In Board of Education v. Pico,74 the Court recognized a stu-
dent's first amendment interest in preventing the removal of controver-
sial books from a public school library. The Pico Court also recognized,
however, that "[school officials] might well defend their claim of absolute
discretion in matters of curriculum by reliance on their duty to inculcate
community values." '75 Thus, the Kuhlmeier court could have gone be-
yond the nature of the forum to examine more carefully the state's inter-
est in the case.1 76
Having found that Spectrum was a public forum, the Kuhlmeier
court effectively rejected as irrelevant the school's claimed interest in reg-
ulating the newspaper's content. The court could have reached the same
result, in a more reasoned fashion, by relying on Justice Brennan's rea-
soning in Pico. Writing for a plurality, Justice Brennan noted that the
school had the utmost discretion in matters of curriculum,17 7 and had a
duty to inculcate values. 178 This duty, however, is misplaced where the
school administrators "attempt to extend their claim of absolute discre-
tion beyond the compulsory environment of the classroom, into the
school library and the regime of voluntary inquiry that there holds
sway." '17 9 Since the reading of Spectrum was purely voluntary,180 Justice
Brennan's delimitation of the range of administrative discretion applies
just as readily to it, if not more so. As Chief Justice Burger indicated in
his dissent in Pico, he might well have joined in Justice Brennan's ap-
proach if the school's action had actively "prohibit[ed] a student from
expressing views," 181 as was the case in Kuhlmeier1 82
Relying on Pico to limit the reach of the school administrtation's
curricular discretion, the Kuhlmeier court would have found that Spec-
trum was outside the compass of administrative control. The state and
173. Ambach v. Norwich, 441 U.S. 68, 76-77 (1979).
174. 457 U.S. 853 (1982).
175. Id. at 869.
176. Recent Supreme Court decisions indicate that consideration of the interests of the
parties is not foreclosed by the existence of the public forum doctrine. For example, in City
Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789 (1984), Justice Stevens briefly
noted that streetlamp posts were not a traditional public forum, id. at 813-14, but based his
decision upholding an anti-posting ordinance on the relative importance of the parties' inter-
ests. Id. at 817.
177. Board of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 869 (1982).
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Though arguably the students participating in Journalism II would be less able to
avoid reading the articles, there is no evidence that the reading of their classmates' work would
be required in the same fashion as a textbook. In addition, Journalism II was an elective
course, and thus registration for the course was voluntary.
181. Pico, 457 U.S. at 886 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
182. See supra text accompanying note 22.
student interests, properly identified, could then be balanced. The stu-
dent's right to freedom of expression would prevail over the state inter-
est. Such attention to the parties' interests results in a logically sound
decision which protects state interests without unnecessarily restricting
student expression.
Conclusion
To strike the proper balance between student free speech rights and
the state's interest in regulating student speech, courts must carefully ex-
amine the interests at stake. In Tinker, the Supreme Court provided rare
guidance in balancing these interests in the high school setting. The
court in Kuhlmeier rightly looked to Tinker for guidance in evaluating
school censorship of student speech. Tinker, however, has left several
issues unresolved concerning the importance of ties between student
speech and the curriculum, the constitutionality of prior restraint, and
the ambiguous language of the Tinker test itself. While the Kuhlmeier
court reached a result consistent with Supreme Court precedent, its rea-
soning was doctrinally confused, and largely unsupported.
The Supreme Court will hear the Kuhlmeier case during the fall
Term of 1987. The Court faces an opportunity to continue its examina-
tion, begun in Tinker, of competing first amendment interests in the high
school environment. The fruits of such an examination could be the
much needed answers to the three Kuhlmeier issues that Tinker left in its
choppy wake. In reaching a decision on the extent of a school adminis-
tration's curricular control, the Court can send a strong signal by avoid-
ing use of the distracting public forum doctrine. The Court may provide
better guidance for lower courts by expanding the interest based analysis
it initiated in Tinker, and resumed in Pico, to arrive at a standard which
comes closest to accomodating the interests of both the individual stu-
dent and the state.
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